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Based on a transparent analytical model of multiple markets including corn, ethanol, 
gasoline, and transportation fuel, this study estimates the welfare changes for consumers 
and producers resulting from ethanol production and related support polices in 2007. The 
welfare estimation takes into account the second-best gain from eliminating loan 
deficiency payments. The results suggest the total social cost is about $0.78 billion for 
given market parameters. We validate the model’s underlying assumption and test for the 
results’ sensitivity to assumed parameters.  
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Introduction 
The ethanol industry in the United States receives support on several different fronts. 
There are three major categories:  
1. Budgetary support measures, including a 51¢-per-gallon tax credit to refiners 
blending ethanol with gasoline. This is scheduled to fall to 45¢ in January 2009.  
2. A renewable fuel standard (RFS) that requires U.S. fuel producers to blend into 
gasoline at least a certain amount of renewable fuel, ranging from 9 billion 
gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022.  
3. Trade restrictions, including a 2.5% ad valorem tariff and a per unit tariff of 
54¢ per gallon.  
The benefits and pitfalls of this level of government support have been at the center of 
recent debate.  
In this study we investigate the distribution of welfare gains and losses from the 
ethanol blenders tax credit among producers and consumers in the corn, ethanol, gasoline, 
and fuel markets and estimate the overall welfare impact of the U.S. ethanol subsidy. To 
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to include the impact of ethanol on the 
gasoline market, and to acknowledge in a multimarket framework that prior to the 
existence of a large ethanol industry, commodity markets were already in a second-best 
situation.  
There are an increasing number of studies on the topic. Babcock simulates the welfare 
impacts of various government ethanol policies in a model of multiple integrated markets. 
He finds that U.S. ethanol policy induces a large welfare transfer from taxpayers and non-
ethanol corn users to corn producers, fuel blenders, and ethanol producers, as well as 
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large associated net welfare loss. Gardner uses a vertical market model of corn, ethanol, 
and by-products and compares welfare effects of the government subsidy on corn through 
deficiency payments and the government subsidy on ethanol produced from corn. He 
finds that the net deadweight loss of the corn and ethanol subsidies is likely to be in the 
billions of dollars annually. The deadweight loss of the ethanol subsidy is much higher 
than that of deficiency payments. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the 
corn price increases by only 4¢ from the ethanol subsidy, an amount that is much lower 
than we use below. Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz calculate the impact of ethanol subsidies 
on corn used for ethanol and indicate that the treasury cost of the ethanol tax credit is 
about $1.0 billion lower than the cost of direct payment to corn farmers.  
Martinez-Gonzalez, Sheldon, and Thompson use a partial equilibrium trade model and 
a back-of-envelope formula to calculate welfare effects of distortions in the ethanol 
market. Elobeid and Tokgoz analyze the impact of trade liberalization and removal of the 
U.S. federal tax credit on ethanol markets, excluding energy markets, in a multimarket 
international ethanol framework. They find that trade liberalization induces a welfare loss 
for ethanol and corn producers and a gain in consumer surplus through lower ethanol and 
corn prices. Also, the removal of the tariff and tax credit results in declines in the surplus 
of corn farmers, ethanol producers, and ethanol consumers. De Gorter and Just analyze 
the efficiency and income distribution effects of the ethanol tax credit and illustrate the 
potential welfare effects. They find a net deadweight loss of $1.07 billion per year. 
Taheripour and Tyner find that the share of the ethanol subsidy received by ethanol 
producers (1) increases with the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and gasoline 
and also with the proportion of ethanol blended in fuel, and (2) decreases with the price 
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elasticity of ethanol. They conclude that the ethanol industry is, and will continue to be, 
in a good position to capture the ethanol credit regardless of its current share. 
Our paper differs from the existing literature in several important ways. First, we 
develop an analytical model explicit in its accounting of ethanol, gasoline, and fuel 
markets.1 Second, we estimate the welfare impacts on agricultural and energy markets, 
and on overall welfare change after accounting for reduced loan deficiency payments. We 
estimate welfare changes by both traditional consumer (producer) surplus formulas and 
the compensating variation measure. Finally, we validate the model’s underlying 
assumptions and test for sensitivity of the main results to market parameters.  
 
The Analytical Model 
In the model, the corn market includes ethanol and non-ethanol demand and corn 
supply. The fuel market includes gasoline and ethanol separately to disentangle the 
relationship between these markets and better capture the substitution effect of ethanol on 
gasoline. We provide a graphical illustration of the corresponding welfare changes in 
terms of consumer and producer surplus. This study does not explicitly evaluate the 
impact of the import tariff or the consumption mandate, because the import tariff is so 
similar in magnitude to the blenders credit. Imported Brazilian ethanol is subject to the 
54¢ import tariff but then benefits from the 51¢ blenders credit so these two 
approximately offset each other. We ignore the ethanol mandate because it was not 
binding in the base period since high energy prices encouraged ethanol production to 
grow beyond the ethanol mandate that was in place that year. Also, we have not 
considered the impact of induced higher prices of other crops. It seems likely that 
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consumers of these other crops lost and producers gained and loan deficiency payments 
fell as a result of ethanol subsidies. We also ignore the possible environmental benefits or 
costs of ethanol production and consumption.  
 
Corn Market 
Consider the standard supply and demand model for corn graphically depicted in 
figure 1, where CS  is the supply schedule and 
ne
CD  represents non-ethanol demand for 
corn including feed, exports, and other consumption. The equilibrium price and quantity 
are CP  and CQ , respectively. In this original equilibrium, given the loan rate in the 2002 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI), corn producers receive a price 
of LRP  for each bushel of corn produced, yielding a total production of LRQ  bushels, and 
the market clears at price 0P . Loan deficiency payments (LDPs) generate producer 
surplus of 'LR CP C DP , consumer surplus of 0'CP DB P , and taxpayer costs of 0' 'LRP C B P , 
which add up to a deadweight loss of the area ' 'C DB .  
Increasing demand for ethanol production pushes up the equilibrium corn price to 'CP , 
which is higher than the loan rate LRP . This higher equilibrium price results in corn 
production of 'CQ , while non-ethanol demand drops to 
''
CQ . The amount of corn 
represented by the distance of ' ''C CQ Q−  is used for ethanol production. Under price 'CP , 
the total corn demand curve including ethanol is CD . The total gain for the producer is 
represented by the area ' LRACC P  , while the loss of consumer surplus is the area 
0'ABB P . The taxpayer cost of moving the corn demand curve out is considered within 
the energy market because it appears in the form of a blenders tax credit. In addition, this 
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higher equilibrium corn price eliminates LDPs to farmers. The corresponding welfare 
gain for taxpayers is the shaded area 0' 'LRP C B P  in figure 1.
 2 
 
Ethanol, Gasoline, and Transportation Fuel Markets 
The markets for ethanol, gasoline, and fuel are in the left and right panels of figure 2. 
The horizontal axis is measured in gallons of gasoline equivalent and the vertical axis is 
measured in the price of gasoline (or fuel) because the energy of 2.66 gallons of ethanol 
is equivalent to 1.74 gallons of gasoline. That is, we measure the quantity of ethanol in 
0.65 gallon units. When we measure the blenders tax credit in energy equivalence, it is 
equal to 78¢ per gallon. Demand for non-fuel ethanol and total ethanol supply are 
represented by nfeD  and eS , respectively, which appear in the left panel of figure 2. We 
assume that U.S. non-fuel ethanol demand is perfectly inelastic because demand for 
unadulterated ethanol comes primarily from medical uses and is very small, at 380 
million gallons in 2007.  
In the right panel of figure 2, supply in the gasoline market is given by gS . Without 
the ethanol tax credit t , equilibrium prices are nfeP  and gP  in the two respective markets. 
Ethanol demand for fuel use is zero at this original equilibrium price. The amount of 
ethanol that will be supplied for fuel at prices higher than nfeP  is given by the excess 
supply curve eXS . The 51¢ federal tax credit t  (or 78¢ in the gasoline equivalent unit) 
has the effect of shifting the demand for ethanol used in fuel to 'eD . The intersection of 
demand and supply curves leads to a new equilibrium ethanol price of feP , at which the 
excess supply of ethanol used in fuel is represented by (= 'feFH P H  on the excess supply 
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curve in the right panel). In the ethanol market, producers’ gain is represented by the 
hatched area f nfe eFP P G . Consumer surplus does not change because the non-fuel ethanol 
demand curve is vertical.  
We shift down the excess supply curve of ethanol by the amount of the tax credit t  to 
'
eXS . The new fuel supply curve is fS  with the amount of ethanol  (= ')
f
f eP I P H  and 
gasoline fP J . The resulting equilibrium fuel price is fP . Gasoline use is reduced by the 
amount of JL , which is substituted by ethanol, and fuel consumption is increased by the 
distance of LK  because of the lower price of fuel. In the total fuel demand of fP K , the 
amount of JK  is met by ethanol, which is equal to the amount of fP I . Gasoline 
producers lose the area g fP MJP  and fuel consumers gain the area g fP MKP . The net 
change of consumer and producer surpluses is represented by the hatched area MKJ . 
The amount of government payments for the ethanol tax credit is represented by the 
shaded area 'fe fP H IP . The producer surplus in the ethanol market is the shaded area 
FHG  in the left panel of figure 2. We assume that the non-fuel ethanol demand is 
negligible compared with fuel ethanol production. 
The total ethanol tax credit t  consists of three components: (1) the reduction in the 
fuel price because of ethanol substitution denoted by g fP P− ; (2) the price change in the 
ethanol market, f nfe eP P− ; and (3) the price difference between nfeP and gP . The price 
change of f nfe eP P−  represents the “wasted” portion of the tax credit, which is used to 
make the ethanol production economically feasible, and is referred to as “water” by de 
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Gorter and Just. Although qualitative relations exist among these three components, the 
specific cut-off points vary over time and critically depend on corn and crude oil prices.  
 
Welfare Estimates 
Given the annual market data and assumed parameters, as shown in table 1, the net 
welfare loss in the U.S. corn market is approximately $2.12 billion, as presented in table 
2. The welfare gain from the reduced LDPs for corn is $3.45 billion according to the 
average actual payments of 2005 and 2006.3 The change of producer surplus in the 
ethanol market is about $0.86 billion, while the net welfare change before the 
government cost of the ethanol credit is estimated to be $0.29 billion in the gasoline/fuel 
market. Ethanol production in 2007 provided a benefit to corn, ethanol producers, and 
gasoline/fuel consumers. It reduced welfare for grain consumers and gasoline refiners. 
The overall net welfare loss is approximately $0.78 billion.  
The basic parameters assumed for U.S. corn and gasoline markets are summarized in 
table 1. In the corn market, the elasticity of demand is assumed to be -0.15 with range 
of -0.10 to -0.20, while the elasticity of supply is 0.27 ranging and ranges from 0.13 to 
0.40. We take these parameters from Elobeid and Tokgoz. 4  The short-run gasoline 
elasticity of demand is -0.35 with a range of -0.2 to -0.5 and that of supply is 0.25 varying 
from 0.1 to 0.4. The elasticity parameters in the gasoline market are based on a survey 
conducted by Graham and Glaister.  
We calibrate the model to 2007 market data of price and production, which are also 
reported in table 1. There are three important price changes for the welfare analysis: (1) 
the reduction in the fuel price, g fP P− , which is estimated as $0.14 in Du and Hayes; (2) 
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the increase in the corn price, 'C CP P− , which is $1.27 as reported in Tokgoz et al.; and (3) 
the price change in the ethanol market, f nfe eP P− . We use average weekly ethanol prices 
in Chicago in 2005 and 2007 to proxy feP  and 
nf
eP , respectively, which results in an 
ethanol price change of 27¢ (or 41¢ in gasoline equivalent units). The ethanol weekly 
prices are obtained from Ethanol and Renewable Fuel News.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Gardner and Tyner point out that elasticity assumption is critical for the evaluation of 
welfare changes since these parameters summarize the price responsiveness to policy 
interventions. In order to test for the sensitivity of our welfare estimates on these 
assumptions, we evaluate the overall welfare gains for the given ranges of demand and 
supply elasticities of corn and gasoline markets. The results are depicted in figures 3 and 
4. The net welfare loss varies from $0.22 billion to $1.38 billion, as corn demand and 
supply elasticities vary in the given ranges. Similarly, the net welfare loss is in the range 
of $0.21 billion to $1.36 billion, as elasticities of gasoline change.  
It has been established that an ordinary consumer surplus measure requires a 
restrictive path-independence condition on the utility function and constant marginal 
utility of income so as to ensure its uniqueness as a money measure (Just, Hueth, and 
Schmitz, p. 136). Compensating and equivalent variation is the recommended alternative 
and provides measures related to actual changes in utility. Following the indirect 
estimation method developed in Willig and in Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (Section 6.5), we 
calculate the approximate compensating variations in corn and gasoline markets. These 
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approximations are based on the income elasticities and disposable personal income in 
2007 as reported in table 1 and the approximation formula: 
m | |ˆ ˆ(1 )  ,  
2
s CSCE CS s
m
ηε ε Δ= Δ − = =  
where the compensating variation is denoted by CE , and CSΔ  is the change in consumer 
surplus. Income elasticity of demand is denoted by η  while disposable personal income 
is m . The approximation results are presented in table 2. Because of the small ratio of 
surplus change to total disposable income ( 0.01<  in both cases) and income elasticity, 
the difference between two consumer welfare measures is very small. The estimated total 
net welfare loss based on the compensating variation measure is about $0.79 billion.  
 
Conclusion 
Government support policies coupled with high energy prices stimulated a rapid 
increase in ethanol production and associated welfare transfers in multiple markets. We 
find that the net welfare change of the U.S. ethanol subsidy is negative, a result that is 
robust with respect to a reasonable range of alternative parameter values. The markets for 
agricultural commodities were not competitive prior to large-scale ethanol production 
because there was already significant intervention in the form of farm subsidies. Our 
results show that subsidizing U.S. ethanol production generated a small aggregate welfare 







                                                 
1 In this study, fuel refers to gasoline blended with ethanol used for transportation. 
2 Averaged over 2005 and 2006, the LDP for corn is about 81% of total payments.  
3 The actual LDP data are obtained from the CCC Budget Essentials of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) at 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject=landing&topic=bap-bu-cc, last visited 
10/8/2008. 
4 We use the ranges of demand and supply elasticities in the following section to test for sensitivity of the 
welfare estimates.  
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Table 1. Basic market parameters 
 




Price elasticity in demand -0.15 -0.35 -- 
Price elasticity in supply 0.27 0.25 -- 
Average price, 2007 $3.40/bu. $2.84/gal. $2.01/gal. 
Total U.S. production, 2007 13 billion bu. 142 billion gal. 6.4 billion gal. 
Change in price $1.27/bu. $0.14/gal. $0.27/gal. 
Income elasticity of demand 0.1 0.4 -- 
Disposable personal income, 
2007 (billions of dollars) 








Table 2. Welfare changes of corn, ethanol, gasoline, and fuel markets in 2007 
Corn market (billion dollars)   
Change in consumer surplus -16.17 
Compensating variation -16.17 
Change in producer surplus 14.05 
Change in producer and consumer surpluses -2.12 
Change in CE and producer surplus -2.12 
Reduced LDPs 3.45 
Gasoline market (billion dollars)  
Change in consumer surplus 19.71  
Compensating variation 19.70 
Change in producer surplus -19.41 
Change in producer and consumer surpluses 0.30 
Change in CE and producer surplus 0.29 
Ethanol market  
Change in producer surplus (billion dollars) 0.86 
Volumetric excise tax credit in U.S. (dollars per gallon) 0.51 
U.S. taxpayer cost of tax credit (billion dollars) 3.26 
Net welfare loss (billion dollars)   
based on CS 0.78 
based on CE 0.79 
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Figure 3. Net welfare changes for gasoline elasticities 
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